ABSTRACT This paper proposes a novel design and analyzes security performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol over free-space optics (FSO). Unlike conventional QKD protocols based on physical characteristics of quantum mechanics, the proposed QKD protocol can be implemented on standard FSO systems using subcarrier intensity modulation binary phase shift keying and direct detection with a dual-threshold receiver. Under security constraints, the design criteria for FSO transmitter and receiver, in particular, the modulation depth and the selection of dual-threshold detection, respectively, is analytically investigated. For the security analysis, quantum bit error rate, ergodic secret-key rate, and final key-creation rate are concisely derived in novel closed-form expressions in terms of finite power series, taking into account the channel loss, atmospheric turbulence-induced fading, and receiver noises. Furthermore, Monte-Carlo simulations are performed to verify analytical results and the feasibility of the proposed QKD protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the Internet and recent advancements to the Internet of Things, the secure communications for sensitive information over the Internet plays a very crucial role. Conventional security relies solely on the secrecy of an encryption key based on cryptographic algorithms. To achieve unconditional security, two legitimate parties, namely Alice and Bob, must be able to share the secret key over publicly unsecured communication channels. This is also known as the key distribution problem. Unfortunately, conventional key distribution protocols relying on computational complexities are vulnerable to future advances in computer hardware and algorithms. Therefore, such protocols do not provide information-theoretic security, i.e. without any condition of computational assumptions [1] . Quantum key distribution (QKD), on the other hand, promises the principle unconditional security by applying the law of quantum mechanics to securely distribute the key between two legitimate parties in the presence of eavesdropper(s), namely Yuen [2] . The first QKD protocol, widely known as BB84 protocol, was proposed by Bennett and Brassard [3] , by which the legitimate sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) can achieve the secret-key sharing with randomly generated signals encoded by two non-orthogonal quantum states.
Owing to how the information is encoded, there exists two major implementation methods of QKD protocols, namely discrete variable (DV) and continuous variable (CV). In DV-QKD systems, the key information is encoded onto the discrete state of a single photon, such as the phase or polarization [4] . The encoded photons are then transmitted over the quantum channel and detected by a single-photon • We propose a novel free-space CV-QKD system using dual-threshold/direct detection (D-T/DD) with subcarrier intensity modulation binary phase shift keying (SIM/BPSK) signaling. Practically, CSI estimation for D-T settings over fading channels in case of OOK signaling is complicated due to the asymmetry of binary signals (e.g., noise variances are different in bits ''0'' and ''1''). Therefore, the use of SIM/BPSK signaling whose signals of bit ''0'' and ''1'' are symmetric over the ''zero'' level will relax the CSI estimation over the atmospheric turbulence-induced fading channels.
• To confirm the feasibility and reliability of the proposed system, we analytically investigate the design criteria for FSO transmitter and receiver, especially, the modulation depth and the selection of values for D-T settings to maintain the security in the proposed free-space QKD system against a practical attacking strategy from the eavesdropper Eve (i.e., unauthorized receiver attack), with an assumption of fully trusted transmitting and receiving devices at Alice and Bob.
• In addition, we analytically study the secrecy performance of the proposed system by deriving, in newly accurate closed-form expressions, the quantum bit-error rate (QBER), ergodic secret-key rate, and final keycreation rate, taking into account effects of atmospheric channel and receiver noises. The well-known lognormal and Gamma-Gamma distributions are adopted to model the atmospheric turbulence in weak and moderate-to-strong regimes, respectively. Monte-Carlo (M-C) simulations are further implemented to confirm the validity of the analytical results. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides basic concepts and describes the operation of conventional BB84 protocol over an FSO system. Section III then highlights the proposed design concept and system model. The atmospheric turbulence-induced fading channel is modeled and analyzed in Section IV. In Section V, the system secrecy performance metrics are theoretically investigated and derived in closed-form solutions in terms of finite power series. Finally, useful numerical results are discussed in Section VI, and the paper is concluded with summarized key points and future outlook in Section VII.
II. CONVENTIONAL BB84 PROTOCOL OVER FSO A. BB84 PROTOCOL
In this subsection, we provide operational steps of the conventional BB84 protocol in support of the discussion in subsequent sections, which are summarized in four steps as follows [4] .
Step 1: Alice randomly chooses between two linear polarization bases or (i.e., rectilinear or diagonal bases) for every bit that she wants to send. The two bases and constitute four polarization states (−45 bits, or ''qubits'', by encoding random bit values, ''0'' or ''1'', using the following set of polarization codes
The encoded quantum bits are then transmitted over the unsecured channel as discrete single-photons to Bob's receiver. An example of Alice's qubits preparation can be seen in Table 1 .
Step 2: At the receiver, Bob detects the encoded photons by a single-photon detector. To examine the encoded information, a basis, or , is randomly used to measure each photon in the corresponding polarization states. To this point, if Alice's encoding and Bob's decoding bases are the same, the corresponding bit value is read correctly with a high probability. Otherwise, if the two bases are different, 1 the received photon is measured by one of two polarization states of the used basis at Bob's receiver. Thus, bits ''0'' and ''1'' are then decoded, corresponding to the measured polarization states. This is also known as the sifting process as illustrated in Table 1 .
Step 3: After Step 2, the bit sequence detected by Bob and the corresponding bit sequence transmitted by Alice form their partially correlated raw keys. Through a public channel, Alice broadcasts her basis choice for each bit of her raw key, but not the bit value. Bob then reveals on which detected photons the same basis was used to measure (without revealing the bit value he decoded on each one). They both discard photon measurements where Bob used a different basis, which is 50% on average, leaving the remaining bits as their sifted key, as shown in Table 1 .
Step 4: In practice, Bob's sifted key may contain errors due to eavesdropping or channel/detector imperfections. To identify and remove the erroneous bits, Alice and Bob perform information reconciliation by publishing a random sample of their measurements over the public channel and using error correction techniques to correct the transmission errors, which ensures both keys are identical, forming their shared error-free secret key. In addition, to reduce Eve's knowledge of the shared key, Alice and Bob apply the privacy amplification process by using their shared keys to produce a new, shorter key based on hash functions in such a way that Eve has only negligible information about the new key.
The security of BB84 protocol, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, lies in the fact that Alice encodes her information in non-orthogonal states or so that an eavesdropper Eve cannot sufficiently distinguish the two states and errors unavoidably occur when she eavesdrops [22] .
B. FREE-SPACE QKD USING BB84 PROTOCOL
Illustratively, Fig. 1 shows the simplified schematic diagram of a free-space QKD system employing the BB84 protocol.
At Alice's side, a single-photon source is used to emit single photons, which could be ideally achieved with the help of a semiconductor quantum dot [23] . The single photons are then polarized by a polarization controller driven by two random streams of polarization bases and binary bits, which are respectively generated by the random bases generator and random bits generator [24] . The polarization controller encodes the binary bits into random bases according to the rules given in (1) and (2). The encoded photons are then transmitted over an atmospheric turbulence-induced fading channel to Bob. It is found that near-field atmospheric turbulence imposes a modest decrease in the sift probability and an increase in the conditional probability of error in BB84 [25] .
At Bob's side, a set of devices is invoked to measure the received photons, including a 50/50 ordinary beam splitter to provide a passive, random choice of polarization bases VOLUME 6, 2018 for a single photon, half-wave plates for converting the basis to and vice versa, and polarizing beam splitters for directing the incoming photons to the designated singlephoton detector. A single-photon detector is a device used to detect the polarized photons. Recently, researchers have successfully developed a practical superconducting nanowire single-photon detector with record detection efficiency over 90% [26] . Based on the detection counted at the designated single-photon detectors of corresponding polarization states, the binary bits originally encoded by Alice on the polarization states could be decoded. Details of the decoding mechanism can be covered in [25] and [27] .
III. PROPOSED DESIGN CONCEPT AND SYSTEM MODEL A. PROPOSED DESIGN CONCEPT
In this section, we describe the design concept for the implementation of the QKD protocol by using SIM/BPSK signaling and D-T/DD. Using the proposed QKD protocol, a CV-QKD function can be achieved and feasibly implemented on standard FSO systems, with simple configurations and sufficient security. Details are as follows.
Step 1: Alice transmits SIM/BPSK modulated signals, i.e. coherent states, with a small modulation depth (0 < δ < 1), corresponding to binary random bits ''0'' or ''1'' over the atmospheric channel. The two modulated signals representing binary bits are two coherent states that are nonorthogonal to each other. Thus, they play a similar role as nonorthogonal bases in BB84 protocol. Step 2: The transmitting modulated signals are then directly detected at Bob's receiver using an avalanche photodiode (APD). Fig. 2 shows the probability density function (PDF) of Bob's received BPSK signals influenced by the atmospheric turbulence-induced fading channel and receiver quantum noise, which are symmetric over the ''zero'' level. By obtaining the CSI, two levels of the D-T, d 0 and d 1 , can be selected symmetrically over the ''zero'' level. The distribution of the received signals has two peaks corresponding to Alice's bit ''0'' and bit ''1'', which overlap with each other as the modulation depth is small compared to noise variances. For the detected value x of the received current signal, the detection rule can be expressed as
where X represents the case that Bob creates no bit, which corresponds to the case of wrong basis selection in the BB84 protocol. It is noted that the random fluctuations in the received signals over the atmospheric channel result in random detection results of ''0'', X, and ''1'' at the D-T. This randomness is uncorrelated with Eve's one as it results from channel fading and quantum noises. It is practical and feasible to consider the signals arriving at Eve's and Bob's receivers experience uncorrelated fading as Eve's receiver should be separated from Bob's within distance in the order of meters for possible eavesdropping, whereas correlation appears when receivers' separated spacing is in the order of centimeters [28] .
Step 3: Using a classical public channel, Bob notifies Alice of the time instants he was able to create binary bits from detected signals. Alice then discards bit values at time instants that Bob created no bit. Now, Alice and Bob share an identical bit string, which is the sifted key. By obtaining the CSI estimation at the receiver, d 0 and d 1 can be adjusted, thus the probability of sift at Bob's receiver can be controlled. Table 3 illustrates a simple example of the proposed protocol according to the above-mentioned operational steps. Alice transmits bits ''0'' and ''1'' encoded onto SIM/BPSK modulated signals at different time instants, with i 0 and i 1 are intensity-modulated current signals of bits ''0'' and ''1'', which are symmetric over the ''zero'' level and controlled by the modulation depth δ; d 0 and d 1 are two detection thresholds at Bob's receiver, adjusted by obtaining the CSI estimation 2 , e.g. channel state h and noise variance σ 2 N (it is noted that noise variance is the same in bits ''0'' and ''1'' for BPSK signaling). At different time instants, depending on the decision rule in (3), bits ''0'', ''1'', and ''X'' (no bit) are created at Bob's receiver. Over a public channel, Bob notifies Alice of the time instants he created no bits (e.g., t 2 , t 3 , t 4 , t 5 ) so that Alice can discard key bits transmitted at the corresponding time instants, forming their shared sifted key.
Step 4: Similar to the BB84 protocol, further information reconciliation and privacy amplification can then be implemented over the public channel to obtain the final secret key.
The security of this design concept can be explained as follows. Firstly, the modulation depth δ of the SIM/BPSK signals is chosen to be small enough in order that Eve cannot fully distinguish the transmitted state. Eve can also try to use 2 Here, it is assumed that perfect CSI can be obtained at Bob's receiver. The CSI can be estimated by taking advantage of the slowly-varying nature of the FSO channel, i.e. fading remains constant over a large number of transmitted bits for a coherence time in the order of milliseconds [29] . For instance, a few pilot symbols may be transmitted from Alice to Bob so that Bob can estimate the CSI of the fading channel. The data symbols transmitted from Alice followed by the pilot symbols will experience similar channel fading. D-T like Bob does, however, Eve's signal fluctuation is uncorrelated to Bob's one, thus the key bits created by Bob and Eve do not match, as mentioned in Step 2. If Eve tries to decode the key using the optimal threshold (which is d E at ''zero'' as illustrated in Fig. 3 ), she obtains measurements where the two signals are strongly overlapped, thus she will suffer from a high error rate, thereby reducing the knowledge gained by Eve. Secondly, as mentioned in Steps 2 and 3, the probability of sift can also be controlled by Bob via the D-T setting. This means the amount of information shared between Alice and Bob can be controlled. As a result, we can guarantee a positive secrecy rate by properly adjusting the modulation depth and D-T setting so that the mutual information between Alice and Bob is always larger that that gained by Eve under various eavesdropping strategies. Details of the security analysis for the transmitter/receiver design of the proposed system will be further discussed in Section VI. Table 2 summarizes key characteristics of the proposed system, i.e. non-coherent CV-QKD, in comparison with DV-QKD and CV-QKD systems. The key features of the proposed system include simplicity and cost-efficiency, since phasestabilized local laser or expensive single-photon detector is not required. In particular, Intensity Modulation/Direct Detection (IM/DD) systems are commercially available for high data rate, i.e., Gigabits per second (Gbps), and most advantageous for single-wavelength data transmission over short distances. Figure 4 presents a block diagram of the proposed free-space CV-QKD system using SIM/BPSK and D-T/DD receiver with an APD.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
At the transmitter, the source data d(t) is first modulated onto a radio frequency (RF) subcarrier signal using BPSK scheme in which bits ''0'' and ''1'' are represented by two different phases 180 • apart. The subcarrier signal m(t) is sinusoidal having both positive and negative values; therefore a DC bias is added to m(t) before it is used to modulate a continuous-wave laser beam. Let P t (t) denote the transmitted power of the modulated laser beam, we have
where P represents the peak transmitted power, δ is the intensity modulation depth (0 < δ < 1) to avoid overmodulation
where A(t) is the subcarrier amplitude, g(t) is the rectangular pulse shaping function, f c is the subcarrier frequency, and a i ∈ [0, 1] represents the ith binary data. For the sake of simplicity, we normalize the power of m(t) to unity [30] , [31] . At the receiver, the incoming optical field is passed through an optical bandpass filter (OBPF) before being converted into an electrical signal through DD at the APD. A standard RF coherent demodulator is employed to recover the source datâ d(t). Thus, the electrical signal at the output of the APD at the receiver can be written as
VOLUME 6, 2018 is the responsivity (in units of A/W) of the APD with η is the quantum efficiency, q is the electron charge, h is the Planck's constant, v is the optical frequency; g is the average APD gain, and n(t) is the receiver noise. Since the turbulence-induced fading h (t) varies slowly enough, the DC term { ḡ P 2 h (t)} can be filtered out by the OBPF [32] . The electrical signal i r (t) is then passed through the BPSK demodulator shown in Fig. 4 , where the output signal r(t) is demodulated by the reference signal cos(2π f c t) as [32] r (t) = i r (t)cos(2π f c t)
where i 0 and i 1 represent the received current signals for bits ''0'' and ''1'', respectively. Assuming that the dark current is negligible, the receiver noises composing of shot noise, background noise, and thermal noise can be modeled as additive white Gaussian noises (AWGN) with high accuracy [32] . Thus, n(t) is the zero-mean AWGN with variance
where σ 2 sh , σ 2 b , and σ 2 th are respectively the variances of the APD shot noises caused by the received signal, background radiation, and receiver thermal noise, which can be subsequently expressed as
where
denotes the excess noise factor with k A is the ionization factor, F n is the amplifier noise figure, P b is the average received background radiation power, f = R b 2 with R b is the system bit rate, T is the receiver temperature in Kelvin degree, and R L is the APD's load resistance.
After demodulating process, the demodulated electrical signal is being sampled and then used to create binary bits ''0'', ''1'', and no bit (i.e., X), based on D-T/DD with decision rules as described in Section III-A, forming Bob's raw key. Bob then notify Alice of the time instants that only bits ''0'' and ''1'' were created so that Alice can discard the key bits transmitted at other time instants, forming the sifted key.
IV. ATMOSPHERIC CHANNEL MODELS
In our model, the channel coefficient h can be described as h = h l h t , where h l is the channel loss including atmospheric attenuation and geometric spreading loss of the optical beam due to optical diffractions, and h t is the atmospheric turbulence-induced fading.
A. CHANNEL LOSS
The channel loss induced by atmospheric attenuation described by the exponential Beer-Lambert's Law and geometric spreading loss can be formulated as
in which A = π (D/2) 2 is the area of the receiver aperture with D is the diameter, θ is the angle of divergence, β l is the attenuation coefficient, and L is the transmission distance in kilometers [33] .
B. ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE-INDUCED FADING
Inhomogeneities in the temperature and pressure of the atmosphere lead to refractive-index variations along the transmission path, which is commonly known as atmospheric turbulence. An optical wave propagating through the atmosphere is affected by atmospheric turbulence, leading to the irradiance (i.e., intensity) fluctuations, also known as scintillation or fading, observed at the receiver. To statistically characterize the atmospheric turbulence-induced fading, log-normal (LN) and Gamma-Gamma (GG) distribution models have been widely used for characterizing weak and moderate-to-strong turbulence regimes, respectively.
1) LOG-NORMAL TURBULENCE MODEL
For weak turbulence conditions, the PDF of turbulenceinduced fading coefficient h t , governed by the LN distribution, can be expressed as [34] f LN (h
where µ x and σ 2 x are the mean and standard variance of log-amplitude fluctuation. To ensure that the fading does not attenuate or amplify the average power, we normalize the fading coefficient so that E[h t ] = 1, with E[·] denotes the statistical expectation. Doing so requires the choice of µ x = −σ 2
x . Assuming plane wave propagation, σ 2 x can be given as
where λ is the wavelength and L is the transmission distance in meters. C 2 n stands for the refractive index structure coefficient, which varies from 10 −17 to 10 −13 [33] .
2) GAMMA-GAMMA TURBULENCE MODEL
For moderate-to-strong turbulence conditions, the PDF of fading coefficient h t , modeled by a GG distribution, is given as [35] 
where (·) represents the Gamma function defined as (w)
is the modified Bessel function of the second kind of order α − β ; α > 0 and β > 0 are the effective numbers of small-scale and large-scale eddies of scattering environment, respectively. Assuming a plane wave propagation, α and β are approximately expressed as
where σ 2 R is the Rytov variance given as
The Rytov variance in (17) is used to characterize the strength of atmospheric turbulence. According to [36, Fig. 3] , with λ = 1550 nm, the changes in values of C 2 n and L classify σ 2 R into three categories, σ 2 R < 1, σ 2 R ≈ 1, and σ 2 R > 1 that respectively define weak, moderate, and strong turbulence conditions. As a result, having known C 2 n and L, one can determine the turbulence conditions accordingly. 
C. IMPACT OF ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE ON BPSK SIGNALING
To illustrate the impact of atmospheric turbulence-induced fading on electrical BPSK signaling at the receiver, Fig. 5 shows an example of transmitting 100 sample bits using BPSK-modulated signaling over an FSO link, with the data rate R b = 1 Gbps and transmission distance L = 1 km, under the impact of weak and moderate-to-strong turbulence conditions modeled by LN (e.g., C 2 n = 10 −15 ) and GG (e.g., C 2 n = 10 −14 ) distributions, respectively. As is evident, the BPSK signaling received at the receiver suffers from fluctuations due to atmospheric turbulence. Especially, when turbulence becomes stronger, the electrical signal amplitude is severely fluctuated, which consequently results in highly noisy BPSK symbols in the constellation plane at the receiver, as shown in Fig. 6 .
V. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. QUANTUM BIT ERROR RATE
In BB84 protocol, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) can be defined as [4] , [25] 
where P error and P sift are the probabilities of error and sift, respectively. Specifically, P sift is the probability that Bob uses the same bases as Alice's to measure the received photons, from which he decodes a string of bits called sifted key; P error is the probability that there is a number of erroneous bits in the sifted key, caused by technical imperfections and/or Eve's intervention. Thus, QBER reflects the percentage of bit errors in the sifted key. These errors are on the order of a few percent, hence QBER strongly contrasts with the 10 −9 commonly known in optical communications [4] . As a result, the name QBER is used to clearly distinguish it from the bit error rate (BER) used in standard optical communications. Similar to BB84 protocol, we use the metric QBER in (18) with the same purpose of reflecting the bit error rate in the sifted key. Particularly in our proposed system, P sift corresponds to the probability that Bob can detect bits ''0'' and ''1'' using the dual-threshold detection, and P error is the probability that Bob mistakenly decides ''0'' when ''1'' was transmitted and vice versa. These probabilities can be calculated through the joint probabilities between Alice and Bob, respectively given as
From (19) and (20), QBER can be derived as in (18) . Let us denote P A,B (a, b) (a, b ∈ {0, 1}) as the joint probability that Alice's bit ''a'' coincides with Bob's bit ''b'', defined as
where P A (a) = 1 2 is the probability that Alice sends bit ''a'' (a ∈ {0, 1}), since ''1'' and ''0'' are equally likely to be transmitted from Alice. P B|A (b|a) is the conditional probability that Bob creates bit ''b'' when Alice sends bit ''a''. Using two detection thresholds d 0 and d 1 and decision rule in (3), the joint probabilities between Alice and Bob, averaged over the fading channel, are listed in Table 4 .
From Table 4 , the joint probabilities when Alice transmits bits ''0'' and ''1'', averaged over the fading channel, can be respectively expressed as
where a ∈ {0, 1}, i 0 = − (22) and (23), we propose the D-T selections as follows
where ζ is the dual-threshold scale coefficient to adjust d 0 and d 1 . σ 2 N is the noise variance defined in ( 
as the mean irradiance is normalized to unity [30] . It is deduced from (24) that the D-T selections depend on two parameters, which are the modulation depth δ and D-T scale coefficient ζ . By adjusting δ and ζ , we are able to control P sift , P error , and QBER of the QKD system.
1) QBER OVER LOG-NORMAL CHANNELS
The joint probabilities in (22) and (23), over LN channels, can be respectively derived in closed-form expressions as
Here, k is the order of approximation, {ω i } and {x i } (i = −k, −k + 1, ... − 1, 1, 2, ..., k) are weight factors and zeros of the Hermite polynomial, respectively [37] . The proof of (25) and (26) can be found in Appendix VII. By plugging (25) and (26) into (19) and (20), the closed-form solution for the QBER in (18) can be obtained. It is noted that k = 10 gives accurate results for this approximation [34] .
2) QBER OVER GAMMA-GAMMA CHANNELS
The joint probabilities in (22) and (23), over GG channels, can be respectively derived in closed-form expressions as
Here, a i , b i , and ζ i are parameters of a mixture-Gamma (MG) distribution chosen to approximate the GG distribution, with N is the number of mixture components [38] . ν l and τ l are weight factors and abscissas of the Laguerre polynomials, with M is the number of iteration to numerically approximate Laguerre integration [37, Table 25 .9]. The detailed proof of (30) and (31) is provided in Appendix VII. By plugging (30) and (31) into (19) and (20), the closed-form solution for the QBER in (18) can be derived. It is noted that N = M = 10 gives accurate results for this approximation [38] .
B. ERGODIC SECRET-KEY RATE & FINAL KEY-CREATION RATE
To validate the security of the proposed system, we analyze the ergodic secret-key rate, denoted as S, over the atmospheric fading channels. If S is positive, it is theoretically possible that the amount of information gained by Eve can be decreased through the process of privacy amplification [39] . When S is negative, Bob must be able to detect Eve's intervention with Eve is limited solely by laws of physics [40] . After sharing key bit information and performing error correction, Alice and Bob estimate the amount of information leaked to Eve, and exclude it by means of privacy amplification to obtain the final key. From the information theoretical viewpoint, we denote H (B) and H (E) as the information entropies of Bob and Eve, respectively. The conditional entropies of Bob-Alice and Eve-Alice are denoted as H (B|A) and H (E|A), respectively. The mutual information I (A; B) and I (A; E) are defined as the estimation of the amount of information shared between Alice and Bob, and that shared between Alice and Eve, respectively expressed as
in which the key is said to be secure if I (A, B) is higher than I (A, E) [41] . As a result, we define the ergodic secret-key rate as the maximum transmission rate at which the eavesdropper is unable to decode any information, given as [41]
It is noted that the expression of S in (37) corresponds to the uni-directional error correction protocol in the information reconciliation process, in which the error correcting information is sent from Alice through the public channel to Bob (in order for him to error-correct his data) and eavesdropped by Eve. Thus, the leaked amount of information from Alice to Eve, i.e. I (A; E), should be excluded to obtain a secure key. Other types of error correction protocols, e.g. bidirectional or reverse reconciliation [16] , [42] , can also be employed, however, they are not considered in this paper for the sake of conciseness. In practice, the error correction efficiency should be taken into account in investigating I (A; B), nevertheless, we assume perfect error correction efficiency, i.e. 100%, as an upper bound evaluation of the system performance [16] . From (37), the useful bit rate, namely final key-creation rate, after error correction and privacy amplification to exclude the amount of information leaked to Eve from that shared between Alice and Bob, denoted as R f , can be derived as
where R s is the sifted-key rate or raw-key rate, i.e. the length of the raw key that can be produced per unit time that contains the sifting factor, given as R s = P sift R b with R b is the system bit rate [43] .
To obtain S and R f , the mutual information I (A; B) and I (A; E) over both LN and GG atmospheric turbulence channels are derived as follows.
1) MUTUAL INFORMATION BETWEEN ALICE AND BOB, I(A; B)
Alice and Bob share information over the channel as depicted in Fig. 7 , where x i (i ∈ {1, 2}) represents bit ''0'' or ''1'', VOLUME 6, 2018 and y j (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) denotes bit ''0'', X , or ''1'', respectively. p and q are the channel transition probabilities. α and (1 − α) are the probabilities of transmitting bits ''0'' and ''1''. We refer to this type of channel as the binary erasure channel (BEC) with errors [44] . Hence, the mutual information I (A; B) can be derived as
The detailed proof of (39) can be found in Appendix VII. In our system, we have α = 0.5 since the probabilities of transmitting bits ''0'' and ''1'' are equally likely to occur. p, q, and (1 − p − q) are respectively the conditional probabilities that Bob creates bit y j when Alice sends bit x i , which can be deduced from the joint probabilities derived in Section V-A.
2) MUTUAL INFORMATION BETWEEN ALICE AND EVE, I(A; E )
In our system, Eve obtains a bit string through eavesdropping using the optimal detection threshold d E = 0, whose bit values are partially identical to Alice's. Thus, we can consider that Alice and Eve share some information via binary symmetric channel (BSC). As a result, the mutual information I (A; E) can be given as [4] , [41] I (A; E) = 1 + p e log 2 (p e ) + (1 − p e )log 2 (1 − p e ), (40) where p e is the transition probability that Eve correctly detects the transmitted bits. Let e be Eve's error probability, which is defined as
with P A,E (0, 1) and P A,E (1, 0) are the joint probabilities that Eve falsely detects Alice's transmitted bits using threshold detection d E = 0, respectively expressed as
Similar to Section V-A, the joint probabilities between Alice and Eve, averaged over the fading channel, are summarized in Table 5 . Following the same approach as presented in Section V-A, the joint probabilities P A,E (0, 1), P A,E (1, 0), and Eve's probability of error e can also be derived in closedform expressions as in (44) and (45) (over LN channels); (46) and (47) (over GG channels), respectively.
All notations in (44)- (47) are already defined in Section V-A. Plugging (44)- (47) into (41), closed-form expressions for Eve's probability of error can be derived over both LN and GG channels.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS

A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The appeal of QKD protocols mainly comes from the fact that it can provide unconditional security, which means that the security can be proved without imposing any restriction on the computational resources or the manipulation techniques that are available to the eavesdropper acting on the signal [43] . This should not be considered as a synonym for absolute security, which does not exist in any key distribution scheme with security dependent on physical characteristics due to system imperfections and eavesdropper's attacks. The definition of security is indeed a quantitative issue, and there is yet no true valid quantification of QKD security under all possible attacks [2] . As our proposed QKD protocol is based on standard FSO systems with classical signals, simple physical-layer eavesdropping is the most powerful strategy. Several important attacks in quantum cryptography, such as collective attacks and coherent attacks, cannot be beyond the eavesdropping strategy for classical signals [45] . In standard FSO systems, the physical-layer security was analyzed, both theoretically and experimentally, under several popular Eve's attacking strategies [46] - [48] . Particularly, based on the same concept of D-T/DD receiver as in [49] , the security analysis was comprehensively performed for two-way free-space QKD systems, under unauthorized receiver attack (URA), beam-splitting attack (BSA), and intercept-resend attack (IRA) [48] . In [49] , it is confirmed that the proposed one-way free-space QKD system using SIM/BPSK and D-T/DD was secured against IRA with high probability of detecting Eve (more than 99%) over short key length, and some initial results under URA were also discussed. As the optical beamwidth in FSO systems is very narrow and invisible, it is extremely difficult for Eve to intercept in the middle of the transmission between Alice and Bob to perform IRA. In addition, surveillance cameras can be installed at Alice to prevent Eve from performing BSA by locating its receiver near Alice as theoretically assumed in [47] and [48] . Therefore, the most practical attacking strategy for Eve is the URA, by locating its unauthorized receiver within the beam footprint near and/or behind Bob's receiver, since the optical beam experiences geometric spreading as analyzed in Section IV-A.
In this paper, we aim to prove that our proposed QKD protocol, with proper transmitter and receiver settings, is able to achieve positive ergodic secret-key rate (S > 0) in the presence of Eve, thus a secure key can be shared between Alice and Bob. Eve is assumed to be equipped with an APD at her receiver and perform URA near and/or behind Bob's receiver. Transmitting/receiving devices at Alice and Bob are fully trusted. Illustratively, Fig. 8 shows the beam footprints with corresponding radiuses r (m) affected by geometric spreading after transmitting over a distance of L (km), with angle of divergence θ = 10 −3 rad. This figure serves as a reference for the possible positions that Eve can locate her unauthorized receiver within the beam footprint near and/or behind Bob's receiver.
B. SYSTEM DESIGN CRITERIA
In this section, we investigate the criteria for Alice's transmitter and Bob's receiver settings to maintain the security of the proposed system under URA. Secrecy performance metrics are analytically analyzed and in a good agreement with M-C simulations. The system parameters and constants used in the analysis are shown in Table 6 . For a transmission distance of 1 km, the values of C 2 n = 10 −15 , C 2 n = 5 × 10 −14 , and C 2 n = 10 −13 correspond to the weak, moderate, and strong turbulence conditions. LN and GG models are used to characterize weak and moderate-to-strong turbulence, respectively. L A,B and L E,A are the transmission distances between AliceBob and Eve-Alice, respectively.
1) ALICE'S TRANSMITTER DESIGN
In URA, Eve tries to steal information by tapping the transmitted signal within the beam footprint near and/or behind Bob's receiver. To defend against this attack, Alice chooses a small value of modulation depth δ at the transmitter so that Eve will suffer from a high error rate with d E = 0. Assuming that L A,B = 1 km and Eve is close to Bob's receiver, e.g. L E,A = 1 km, Fig. 9 investigates Eve's error rate e, under weak turbulence condition, to find out the proper selection of δ to guarantee that e is sufficiently high, e.g. e > 0.1, while Eve tries to lower e by choosing its optimal average APD gainḡ. It is seen that the chosen values for δ should be δ ≤ 0.4, thus, e > 0.1 is always guaranteed even when Eve selects its optimalḡ = 15. In Fig. 10 , withḡ = 15 and L A,B = 1 km, we confirm the selection of δ by letting Eve locate its receiver within 1 km behind Bob's receiver. The turbulence parameter is set at VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 9. Eve's error probability (e) versus intensity modulation depth (δ) and average APD gain (ḡ). L E ,A = 1 km, P = 0 dBm, C 2 n = 10 −15 (LN model).
FIGURE 10.
Eve's error probability (e) versus intensity modulation depth (δ) and Eve's distance from Alice (L E ,A ).ḡ = 15, P = 0 dBm, C 2 n = 10 −14 (GG model).
C 2 n = 10 −14 so that Eve will experience moderate-to-strong turbulence conditions as L E,A increases. It is seen that when Eve moves further, the received signal at Eve's receiver suffers from stronger turbulence-induced fading, which results in higher e. Therefore, with δ ≤ 0.4, it is confirmed that e > 0.1 while Eve performs URA near and/or behind Bob's receiver.
Furthermore, in Fig. 11 , when L E,A = 1 km, we investigate the impact of different turbulence conditions on Eve's error probability along with the selection of modulation depth δ. It is observed that by choosing δ ≤ 0.4, Eve's error probability is always higher than 0.1 under all turbulence conditions. It is noted that the modulation depth should not be too small as it considerably increases the bit errors at Bob, which might be unable to correct using error-correction codes. In this paper, for further performance analysis, δ = 0.4 is chosen. 
2) BOB'S RECEIVER DESIGN
Regarding the criteria for receiver design, we can control QBER and P sift by adjusting d 0 and d 1 through ζ , as shown in Fig. 12 . Our target is to control P sift ≥ 10 −2 so that the probability of sift is sufficient for Bob to receive information from Alice (e.g., to achieve at least a sifted-key rate at Mbps with typical transmission rates at Gbps of standard FSO systems). At the same time, we also want to keep QBER ≤ 10 −3 so that errors can be feasibly corrected at Mbps sifted-key rate by error-correction codes. After performing error correction to correct errors in the sifted key and privacy amplification to remove Eve's information, Alice and Bob can then share a shorter key, i.e. final secure key. Doing so requires the choice of 1.2 ≤ ζ ≤ 2.35 under weak turbulence conditions ( Fig. 12(a) ), and 1.9 ≤ ζ ≤ 4.35 under strong turbulence conditions (Fig. 12(b) ). In Figs. 13 and 14, we look at another aspect of the performance metric in receiver design by showing the ergodic secret-key rate S versus ζ and Eve-Alice distance L E,A under moderate-to-strong ( Fig. 13) and weak (Fig. 14) turbulence conditions. It is known from Fig. 12(b) that the setting range for ζ is 1.9 ≤ ζ ≤ 4.35 under strong turbulence conditions. Thus, by applying this constraint in Fig. 13 , it is seen that the QKD system is secured (i.e., S > 0) when Eve is located at least 1.7 km away from Alice when ζ = 1.9. Similarly, under weak turbulence conditions (Fig. 14) , the QKD system is secured when Eve is located at least 1.5 km away from Alice when ζ = 1.2. As a result, to guarantee positive secretkey rates, it is necessary to select the smallest possible ζ in the selection ranges corresponding to each turbulence conditions. Finally, the final key-creation rate R f is investigated versus the peak transmitted power P in Fig. 15 with system settings (δ = 0.4, ζ = 1.2) for weak turbulence and (δ = 0.4, ζ = 1.9) for moderate-to-strong turbulence. Eve's location is fixed at L E,A = 1.5 km (i.e., 500 m behind Bob's receiver). As expected, the setting of ζ imposes an explicit effect on R f , as it controls P sift . Consequently, under weak turbulence condition (C 2 n = 10 −15 ) with ζ = 1.2, R f = 10 Mbps can be achieved at P = −2.5 dBm. It is noteworthy that increasing P more than -2.5 dBm leads to a reduction in R f , since it increases the mutual information between Alice and Eve I (A; E). On the other hand, under moderate and strong turbulence conditions (C 2 n = 5 × 10 −14 and C 2 n = 10 −13 , respectively), with ζ = 1.9, R f is reduced since Bob's P sift is smaller. To maximize R f , choosing appropriate values of P becomes crucial, i.e., P = −2 dBm and P = −1.5 dBm under moderate and strong turbulence conditions, respectively. It is also seen that R f at optimal P under strong turbulence is higher than that under moderate turbulence, e.g., up to 5.2 Mbps compared to 3.6 Mbps, respectively. This is logical as I (A; E) is reduced when turbulence becomes stronger under the same setting of ζ .
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
We proposed a novel QKD protocol using SIM/BPSK and D-T/DD receiver with an APD, which can be feasibly implemented on standard FSO systems. The design criteria under practical security constraints for FSO transmitter and receiver, in particular, the modulation depth and the setting for dual-threshold selection, were comprehensively discussed. For performance analysis, important secrecy metrics including QBER, ergodic secret-key rate, and final key-creation rate were analytically derived in novel closed-form expressions in terms of finite power series, considering the impact of atmospheric channel and receiver noises. Finally, analytical results were further verified by M-C simulations.
The results in this paper proved that QKD function can be achieved based on the pulse-based signal level of a laser beam as in standard optical systems. This helps to reduce the deployment cost of future secured networks since standard telecommunication devices can be used, instead of costly and sophisticated single-photon equipment. Consequently, performance analysis and improvement techniques inherited from the rich literature of standard FSO systems can be straightforwardly applied on the proposed free-space QKD system. In the future, it is promising to experimentally implement the proposed QKD protocol in practical FSO systems to verify its feasibility and security efficiency over both horizontal and space communication links. Further physical impairments such as pointing errors and weather effects should also be taken into account. Different improvement techniques (e.g. diversity and relaying techniques) and various error correction methods (e.g. bidirectional or reverse reconciliation) could be investigated to improve the secrecy performance and final key-creation rate of the future QKD systems.
Appendix A PROOF OF THE JOINT PROBABILITIES IN (25) AND (26)
Substituting (11) and (12) into (22) with a = 0, we obtain the expression for P A,B (0, 0) as
Making the change of variable y =
can be rewritten as
Using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature formula [37] 
where k is the order of approximation, {ω i } and {x i } (i = −k, −k + 1, ... − 1, 1, 2, ..., k) are the weight factors and the zeros of the Hermite polynomial, respectively, we obtain the closed-form solution for P A,B (0, 0). By following similar procedures, closed-form solutions for P A,B (a, 0) and P A,B (a, 1), a ∈ {0, 1}, can be derived as in (25) and (26), respectively.
A PROOF OF THE JOINT PROBABILITIES IN (30) AND (31)
Substituting (11) and (14) into (22) with a = 0, we obtain the expression for P A,B (0, 0) as
To facilitate our calculation, the PDF of GG distribution in (53) can be efficiently approximated by an MG distribution, as recently proposed in [38] . Thus, (53) can be rewritten as
where N is the number of mixture components; a i , b i , and ξ i are the parameters of an MG distribution approximating a GG distribution, readily given as [38] 
Making the change of variable y = ξ i h t , (54) can be expressed as
Now, applying the Gaussian-Laguerre quadrature method [37] 
where ν l and τ l are the weight factors and abscissas of the Laguerre polynomials, with M is the number of iteration to numerically approximate Laguerre integration [37, y b i −1 , we obtain the closed-form solution for P A,B (0, 0). By following similar procedures, closed-form solutions for P A,B (a, 0) and P A,B (a, 1), a ∈ {0, 1}, can be derived as in (30) and (31), respectively.
A PROOF OF THE MUTUAL INFORMATION I (A; B) IN (39)
First, the matrix of transmission probabilities of the considered BEC with errors can be expressed as
The output probabilities can be calculated from the input probabilities and the channel matrix as follows 
On the other hand, the joint probability matrix [P (A, B)] can be calculated as 
